Optimal educational choice and redistribution when parental education matters
Higher education plays an important role in determining lifetime earnings. In turn, the decision to become educated depends to a large extent on family characteristics, such as wealth and education. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between fiscal policies and educational choices when parental education matters. We derive optimality conditions for a linear income tax and a lump-sum subsidy for education in a dynamic framework in which generations are linked by educational background. The factors that determine their sign and magnitude include concerns for redistribution, efficiency, and the educational externality on future generations. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 54 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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