The single-bid restriction on milk quota exchanges
On the Danish milk quota exchange each producer can submit a single bid (a quantity and a price limit) only. We demonstrate that this restriction has several distorting effects. First, traders minimise the risk of foregoing profitable trade by submitting their average valuation rather than their marginal valuation of quota. Second, single bids cannot express full demand and supply curves. Therefore, not only the trade volume but also the allocation of quota may be sub-optimal. We evaluate the empirical importance of a single-bid restriction using data from the (multiple-bid) Ontario exchange. The misallocations identified are surprisingly low. This may be due to the character of milk production and the discrete nature of capacity adjustments. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 30 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://www.erae.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:30:y:2003:i:2:p:193-215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.