IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/econjl/v129y2019i619p1119-1138..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

No One Likes To Be Second Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Yair Antler

Abstract

A decision-maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low on the decision-maker's preference list. However, the decision-maker's preferences are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision-maker's preference list from information revealed by the number of failed offers. I explore the adverse effect of the social component in the candidates’ preferences on the decision maker's ability to recruit a suitable candidate.

Suggested Citation

  • Yair Antler, 2019. "No One Likes To Be Second Choice," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(619), pages 1119-1138.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:129:y:2019:i:619:p:1119-1138.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.12573
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julien Grenet & Yinghua He & Dorothea Kübler, 2022. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-04157650, HAL.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:129:y:2019:i:619:p:1119-1138.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/resssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.