IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ajagec/v89y2007i4p1073-1084.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Matching Problem (and Inventories) in Private Negotiation

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher T. Bastian
  • Lance B. Gittings

Abstract

This study examines laboratory market outcomes under alternative matching risk scenarios and advance production. Limited access and/or asymmetry in the number of buyers and sellers cause a matching problem. When sellers hold inventory before sale and there is buyer concentration, prices are about 23% below the competitive level and close to the predicted monopsony price. The bargaining advantage shifts to buyers in this market environment. Sellers can benefit by creating alliances or cooperatives to increase their bargaining position for price and overcome poor access to buyers. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher T. Bastian & Lance B. Gittings, 2007. "The Matching Problem (and Inventories) in Private Negotiation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(4), pages 1073-1084.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:89:y:2007:i:4:p:1073-1084
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01033.x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bastian, Christopher T. & Jones Ritten, Chian & Feuz, Bridger & Nagler, Amy M. & Smutko, Steven, 2018. "Can Producers Bargain for Better Prices? Implications from Wyoming Focus Groups," Journal of the ASFMRA, American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers, vol. 2018.
    2. Phillips, Owen R. & Nagler, Amy M. & Menkhaus, Dale J. & Huang, Shanshan & Bastian, Christopher T., 2014. "Trading partner choice and bargaining culture in negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 178-190.
    3. Chian Jones Ritten & Christopher Bastian & Owen Phillips, 2021. "The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(11), pages 1-20, November.
    4. Phillips, Owen R. & Menkhaus, Dale J., 2010. "The culture of private negotiation: Endogenous price anchors in simple bilateral bargaining experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 705-715, December.
    5. Nagler, Amy M. & Menkhaus, Dale J. & Bastian, Christopher T. & Ehmke, Mariah D. & Coatney, Kalyn T., 2013. "Subsidy Incidence in Factor Markets: An Experimental Approach," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 17-33, February.
    6. Karsyn Lamb & Kristiana Hansen & Christopher Bastian & Amy Nagler & Chian Jones Ritten, 2019. "Investigating Potential Impacts of Credit Failure Risk Mitigation on Habitat Exchange Outcomes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(3), pages 815-842, July.
    7. Menkhaus, Dale J. & Bastian, Christopher T. & Ehmke, Mariah D., 2008. "The Evolving Agricultural Marketplace: Selected Results and Implications for the West from the Laboratory," Western Economics Forum, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 7(2), pages 1-8.
    8. Ehmke, Mariah D. & Nagler, Amy M. & Menkhaus, Dale J. & Bastian, Christopher T. & Young, C. Edwin, 2010. "Is Agricultural Policy Decoupling against Human Nature? Experimental Evidence of Fairness Expectations’ Contributions to Payment Incidence," 2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado 61645, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:89:y:2007:i:4:p:1073-1084. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.