Import Quota Licenses and Market Power
Analyses of import quota regimes typically ignore institutional features under which the quota licenses are administered. However, distributing the bulk of import licenses to a small number of firms can create oligopsony power and hence affect the level of quota rent and the potential success of auctioning licenses. In this paper I test formally for this phenomenon in the U.S. dairy import quota regime. Results suggest that the administration of import licenses for cheese creates oligopsony power for U.S. cheese importing firms. Copyright 1996, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 78 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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