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Designing Checks and Balances

Author

Listed:
  • Dragu, Tiberiu
  • Fan, Xiaochen
  • Kuklinski, James

Abstract

Essential to the Madisonian conception of checks and balances is the division of policy-making authority among multiple actors such that each can veto proposed changes in policy. We use a mechanism design approach to analyze checks and balances institutions. We show that checks and balances institutions in which the most preferred policy of the more moderate player is the unique equilibrium outcome are the only checks and balances institutions that are strategy-proof, efficient, and responsive. Our analysis facilitates a comprehensive evaluation of checks and balances institutions, and our results can serve as a normative benchmark to assess any such institution, regardless of its specific design. We illustrate the applicability of our normative benchmark within the context of constitutional review, a crucial pillar of established democracies, and, increasingly, of developing democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Dragu, Tiberiu & Fan, Xiaochen & Kuklinski, James, 2014. "Designing Checks and Balances," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 9(1), pages 45-86, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00013022
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00013022
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriele Gratton & Massimo Morelli, 2022. "Optimal Checks And Balances Under Policy Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 549-569, May.
    2. Nunnari, Salvatore, 2021. "Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 186-230.
    3. Gerardi, Dino & Grillo, Edoardo & Monzón, Ignacio, 2022. "The perils of friendly oversight," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    4. Gratton, Gabriele & Morelli, Massimo, 2020. "Optimal Checks and Balances Under Policy Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 14745, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Justin Fox & Matthew C Stephenson, 2015. "The welfare effects of minority-protective judicial review," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 499-521, October.
    6. Justin Fox & Mattias Polborn, 2021. "On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(4), pages 430-454, October.

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