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Marginal Cost Pricing and Eminent Domain

Author

Listed:
  • Plassmann, Florenz
  • Tideman, T. Nicolaus

Abstract

There are three separate strands of literature in economics that are related to the efficiency of takings under eminent domain: one addresses the question of optimal compensation for properties that are taken, the second inquires how governments might learn the values of properties that they consider taking, while the third analyzes solutions to the problem of land assembly. This essay reviews these strands of literature and argues that the principle of marginal cost pricing can be used as a unifying principle for integrating them.

Suggested Citation

  • Plassmann, Florenz & Tideman, T. Nicolaus, 2011. "Marginal Cost Pricing and Eminent Domain," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 7(1), pages 1-110, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:fntmic:0700000050
    DOI: 10.1561/0700000050
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient collective decision-making, marginal cost pricing, and quadratic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 45-73, July.
    2. Nicolaus Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2017. "Efficient bilateral taxation of externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 109-130, October.
    3. Chaturvedi, Rakesh & Kanjilal, Kiriti, 2021. "Experimental analysis of a land assembly mechanism," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    4. Chaturvedi, Rakesh, 2020. "Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 325-335.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eminent domain; Just compensation; Takings; Self-assessment; Land assembly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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