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Generous with individuals and selfish to the masses

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer

    (University of Zurich)

  • Jaume García-Segarra

    (Universitat Jaume I de Castelló)

  • Alexander Ritschel

    (University of Zurich)

Abstract

The seemingly rampant economic selfishness suggested by many recent corporate scandals is at odds with empirical results from behavioural economics, which demonstrate high levels of prosocial behaviour in bilateral interactions and low levels of dishonest behaviour. We design an experimental setting, the ‘Big Robber’ game, where a ‘robber’ can obtain a large personal gain by appropriating the earnings of a large group of ‘victims’. In a large laboratory experiment (N = 640), more than half of all robbers took as much as possible and almost nobody declined to rob. However, the same participants simultaneously displayed standard, predominantly prosocial behaviour in Dictator, Ultimatum and Trust games. Thus, we provide direct empirical evidence showing that individual selfishness in high-impact decisions affecting a large group is compatible with prosociality in bilateral low-stakes interactions. That is, human beings can simultaneously be generous with others and selfish with large groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Jaume García-Segarra & Alexander Ritschel, 2022. "Generous with individuals and selfish to the masses," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 6(1), pages 88-96, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:nat:nathum:v:6:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1038_s41562-021-01170-0
    DOI: 10.1038/s41562-021-01170-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Detemple, Julian & Kosfeld, Michael, 2023. "Fairness and Inequality in Institution Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 16464, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. François Cochard & Alexandre Flage, 2023. "Sharing Losses in Dictator and Ultimatum Games: A Meta-Analysis," Working Papers 2023-09, CRESE.

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