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Cooperation, clustering, and assortative mixing in dynamic networks

Author

Listed:
  • David Melamed

    (Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210)

  • Ashley Harrell

    (Department of Organizational Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109)

  • Brent Simpson

    (Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208)

Abstract

Humans’ propensity to cooperate is driven by our embeddedness in social networks. A key mechanism through which networks promote cooperation is clustering. Within clusters, conditional cooperators are insulated from exploitation by noncooperators, allowing them to reap the benefits of cooperation. Dynamic networks, where ties can be shed and new ties formed, allow for the endogenous emergence of clusters of cooperators. Although past work suggests that either reputation processes or network dynamics can increase clustering and cooperation, existing work on network dynamics conflates reputations and dynamics. Here we report results from a large-scale experiment (total n = 2,675) that embedded participants in clustered or random networks that were static or dynamic, with varying levels of reputational information. Results show that initial network clustering predicts cooperation in static networks, but not in dynamic ones. Further, our experiment shows that while reputations are important for partner choice, cooperation levels are driven purely by dynamics. Supplemental conditions confirmed this lack of a reputation effect. Importantly, we find that when participants make individual choices to cooperate or defect with each partner, as opposed to a single decision that applies to all partners (as is standard in the literature on cooperation in networks), cooperation rates in static networks are as high as cooperation rates in dynamic networks. This finding highlights the importance of structured relations for sustained cooperation, and shows how giving experimental participants more realistic choices has important consequences for whether dynamic networks promote higher levels of cooperation than static networks.

Suggested Citation

  • David Melamed & Ashley Harrell & Brent Simpson, 2018. "Cooperation, clustering, and assortative mixing in dynamic networks," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 115(5), pages 951-956, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:nas:journl:v:115:y:2018:p:951-956
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jose A. Cuesta & Carlos Gracia-L'azaro & Yamir Moreno & Angel S'anchez, 2018. "Reputation is required for cooperation to emerge in dynamic networks," Papers 1803.06035, arXiv.org.
    2. Yang, Yimei & Sun, Hao & Hou, Dongshuang, 2023. "Heterogeneous negotiation undermines cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 622(C).
    3. Li, Wen-Jing & Jiang, Luo-Luo & Chen, Zhi & Perc, Matjaž & Slavinec, Mitja, 2020. "Optimization of mobile individuals promotes cooperation in social dilemmas," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    4. Zheng, Junjun & He, Yujie & Ren, Tianyu & Huang, Yongchao, 2022. "Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with segregated networks and periodic invasion," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 596(C).
    5. Arno Riedl & Ingrid M. T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2021. "Free Neighborhood Choice Boosts Socially Optimal Outcomes in Stag-Hunt Coordination Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 9012, CESifo.
    6. Xiang-Hao Yang & Hui-Yun Huang & Yi-Chao Zhang & Jia-Sheng Wang & Ji-Hong Guan & Shui-Geng Zhou, 2023. "Short Memory-Based Human Strategy Modeling in Social Dilemmas," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(12), pages 1-15, June.
    7. Jiang, Zhi-Qiang & Wang, Peng & Ma, Jun-Chao & Zhu, Peican & Han, Zhen & Podobnik, Boris & Stanley, H. Eugene & Zhou, Wei-Xing & Alfaro-Bittner, Karin & Boccaletti, Stefano, 2023. "Unraveling the effects of network, direct and indirect reciprocity in online societies," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    8. Kasper Otten & Ulrich J. Frey & Vincent Buskens & Wojtek Przepiorka & Naomi Ellemers, 2022. "Human cooperation in changing groups in a large-scale public goods game," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-11, December.
    9. Fabio Della Rossa & Fabio Dercole & Anna Di Meglio, 2020. "Direct Reciprocity and Model-Predictive Strategy Update Explain the Network Reciprocity Observed in Socioeconomic Networks," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-28, March.
    10. Xiaochen Wang & Lei Zhou & Alex McAvoy & Aming Li, 2023. "Imitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 14(1), pages 1-11, December.

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