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Owner or Holder? A Critical Study of Property Rights in Public Services

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  • Claudine Desrieux

Abstract

This paper deals with efficient organizational choices for the provision of public services. To better apprehend observed contracts of public-private partnerships, we depart from the property -rights literature to distinguish between ownership, rights to make residual decisions, and rights to receive residual benefits. Indeed, such rights can be temporarily transferred to a private firm, even if ownership of the assets remains public. Hence, such a separation makes it possible to analyse the large continuum of contracts from full private to full public management. Our results show that there is always a degree of private involvement that is socially efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudine Desrieux, 2009. "Owner or Holder? A Critical Study of Property Rights in Public Services," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 165(2), pages 230-249.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:doi:10.1628/093245609789273259
    DOI: 10.1628/093245609789273259
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    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017. "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 153-165.
    2. Süssmuth Bernd & von Weizsäcker Robert K., 2011. "Shooting Rampages and Maintenance of Campus Safety: An Incomplete Contracts Perspective," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 573-600, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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