Interest Groups in the Colombian Electrical Industry Regulation
There's an existing trend on the current public service dynamics that thinks the State as entity. Such entity is limited to establishing prices and qualities of the services it regulates, based on costs and information offered by agents: thus, full-filling a function essentially technical. The idea developed herein is quite different: the State's action and regulation is taken into account as an interaction of the interest groups that use the coercive power of the State or regulating agencies to capture rents at the expense of less organized groups. This analytical perspective allows working regulation as a political economy phenomenon; whereby, the different actors of a democratic government such as the Colombian, use the power elements offered by the system to obtain the highest possible benefits in the regulatory game.
Volume (Year): (2005)
Issue (Month): 62 (Enero-Junio)
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