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On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games


  • Giacomo Bonanno
  • Klaus Nehring


No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 1998. "On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 291-295, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:291-295
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1005090905103

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Trost, 2013. "Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 755-776, August.
    2. Robert Stalnaker, 1998. "Response to Bonanno and Nehring," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 297-299, December.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno & Elias Tsakas, 2017. "Qualitative analysis of common belief of rationality in strategic-form games," Working Papers 175, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.


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