Does Political Reform Increase Wealth?: Or, Why the Difference between the Chicago and Virginia Schools Is Really an Elasticity Question
This paper shows that, contrary to G. S. Becker's work, there is no innate tendency for political competition to reduce the total cost of government wealth transfers. Simple examples demonstrate how the effects of government policies on total wealth boil down to the elasticities of the marginal support and opposition curves. Disagreements between the Chicago and Virginia schools of political economy can be understood as a disagreement about these elasticities. The broader implications for this argument in terms of the efficiency of the common law are also discussed. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:91:y:1997:i:3-4:p:219-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.