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Income Redistribution: An International Perspective

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  • Horowitz, John B
  • Bohanon, Cecil E

Abstract

Many view global income inequality as a problem. Income redistribution from the rich countries to poor countries is often offered as a solution. However, such redistribution would have to be politically acceptable to voters in rich countries to occur. Using a constructed distribution of world income, the authors show that even modest income redistribution efforts would impose significant costs on taxpayer-voters in rich countries. They conclude such income redistribution is unlikely. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Horowitz, John B & Bohanon, Cecil E, 1996. "Income Redistribution: An International Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(3-4), pages 305-323, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:89:y:1996:i:3-4:p:305-23
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    Cited by:

    1. John B. Horowitz, 2002. "Why Higher Real Wages May Reduce Altruism for the Poor," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 28(3), pages 351-362, Summer.
    2. Yunker, James A., 2006. "Swords into plowshares: Financing a world economic equalization program," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 563-593, July.
    3. Yunker, James A., 2004. "Could a Global Marshall Plan be Successful? An Investigation Using The WEEP Simulation Model," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1109-1137, July.

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