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Economic and Political Determinants of Fee Income in Norwegian Local Governments

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  • Borge, Lars-Erik

Abstract

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of fee income in Norwegian local governments. The point of departure is a representative voter model emphasizing the effects of pure economic variables. The benchmark model is extended by including two aspects of the political system: ideology and strength. It is evident that increased socialist influence increases the size of the local public sector, while a strong political leadership has an advantage in opposing pressure to increase spending. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Borge, Lars-Erik, 1995. "Economic and Political Determinants of Fee Income in Norwegian Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(3-4), pages 353-373, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:83:y:1995:i:3-4:p:353-73
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernardino Benito & María-Dolores Guillamón & Ana-María Ríos, 2017. "The electoral budget cycle on municipal waste collection expenditure," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(41), pages 4161-4179, September.
    2. Borge, Lars-Erik, 2005. "Strong politicians, small deficits: evidence from Norwegian local governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 325-344, June.
    3. Rolf Aaberge & Audun Langørgen, 1997. "Fiscal and Spending Behavior of Local Governments: An Empirical Analysis Based on Norwegian Data," Discussion Papers 196, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    4. Allers, Maarten & de Haan, Jakob & Sterks, Cees, 2001. "Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 351-363, March.
    5. Jon H. Fiva & Olle Folke & Rune J. Sørensen, 2013. "The Power of Parties," CESifo Working Paper Series 4119, CESifo.
    6. Lana Krehic, 2022. "How do increases in electric vehicle use affect urban toll ring prices?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 193(3), pages 187-209, December.
    7. Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros & Noemí Mordán & Isabel-María García-Sánchez, 2014. "Is Local Financial Health Associated with Citizens’ Quality of Life?," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 119(2), pages 559-580, November.
    8. Audun Langørgen & Dag Rønningen, 2004. "Local government preferences, individual needs, and the allocation of social assistance," Discussion Papers 380, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    9. Lars-Erik Borge & Jørn Rattsø, 2005. "The Relationships between Cost and User Charges: The Case of the Norwegian Utility Service," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 61(1), pages 98-119, March.
    10. Marcel Gérard & Laurent van Malderen, 2012. "Tax Interaction among Walloon Municipalities: Is there Room for Yardstick Competition, Intellectual Trend and Partisan Monopoly Effect?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4025, CESifo.
    11. Lars-Erik Borge, 2006. "Centralized or decentralized financing of local governments? Consequences for efficiency and inequality of service provision," Working Paper Series 7806, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    12. PÃ¥l E Martinussen & Per Arnt Pettersen, 2001. "Linking Coalitions to Policy Output: The Case of Local Government in Norway," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 19(3), pages 391-411, June.
    13. Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2017. "Political determinants of municipal accounts: Quasi-experimental evidence from Portugal," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 238, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics, revised 2017.
    14. Borge, Lars-Erik, 2000. "Charging for public services: the case of utilities in Norwegian local governments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 703-718, December.
    15. Rune Sørensen, 2006. "Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 75-95, April.
    16. De Santo, Alessia & Le Maux, Benoît, 2023. "On the optimal size of legislatures: An illustrated literature review," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    17. Laurent Van Malderen & Marcel Gérard, 2012. "Tax Interaction Among Walloon Municipalities: Is There Room For Partisan Monopoly Effect?," ERSA conference papers ersa12p1051, European Regional Science Association.
    18. Maarten Allers & J. Elhorst, 2005. "Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pages 493-513, August.

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