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Parties’ and voters’ dilemmas under Italy’s new mixed electoral system

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  • Alessandro Chiaramonte

    (University of Florence)

  • Aldo Paparo

    (University of Florence)

Abstract

The Italian electoral system introduced in 2017 represents a unique experiment within the broad realm of mixed electoral systems, meriting both theoretical reflection and empirical investigation. This article examines the design of the system and evaluates its effects on political parties, voters, and the party system alike in the 2018 and 2022 general elections. We analyze how the competing incentives of the majoritarian and proportional tiers shaped the strategic behavior of political parties and voters. For parties, the system incentivized coalition formation in single-member districts (SMDs) but permitted independent competition in multi-member districts (MMDs). Yet, this coordination proved partial and uneven—with center-left parties struggling to fully leverage the majoritarian incentives. Voters, on the other hand, largely ignored the SMD tier and behaved as if the system were purely proportional. Strategic voting was minimal, as voters focused on party lists in the proportional tier. These patterns of limited or absent strategic behavior resulted not only from the specific design of the electoral system, but also, and more crucially, from contextual factors—such as high electoral volatility and the structures of party competition observed in the two elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Chiaramonte & Aldo Paparo, 2025. "Parties’ and voters’ dilemmas under Italy’s new mixed electoral system," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 204(1), pages 51-74, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:204:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-025-01303-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-025-01303-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alessandro Chiaramonte & Vincenzo Emanuele & Nicola Maggini & Aldo Paparo, 2022. "Radical-Right Surge in a Deinstitutionalised Party System: The 2022 Italian General Election," South European Society and Politics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 329-357, July.
    2. Alessandro Chiaramonte & Vincenzo Emanuele & Nicola Maggini & Aldo Paparo, 2018. "Populist Success in a Hung Parliament: The 2018 General Election in Italy," South European Society and Politics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 479-501, October.
    3. Marek M. Kaminski, 2018. "Spoiler effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from eight Polish parliamentary elections, 1991–2015," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 441-460, September.
    4. Martin J. Bull & Gianfranco Pasquino, 2018. "Italian Politics in an Era of Recession: The End of Bipolarism?," South European Society and Politics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 1-12, January.
    5. Miguel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2009. "Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 477-494, September.
    6. Michael Herrmann, 2012. "Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law: an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 63-90, April.
    7. Clough, Emily, 2007. "Strategic Voting Under Conditions of Uncertainty: A Re-Evaluation of Duverger's Law," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 313-332, April.
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