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Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives

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  • K. Kanthak

Abstract

Most studies of committee agency in theU.S. House of Representatives consider theideological location of the committee’smedian with respect to some agent. Littlestudied, however, is the effect committeeagency may have on legislators seekingcommittee assignments. I show that whencommittees are agents to the party,legislators feel pressure to selectideological positions more proximate to theparty. They respond to this pressure byexhibiting voting behavior more similar tothe preferences of the party median. Committee assignments, then, are a means bywhich parties can influence the votingbehavior of their members. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

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  • K. Kanthak, 2004. "Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 391-412, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:121:y:2004:i:3:p:391-412
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-1685-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bullock, Charles S., 1972. "Freshman Committee Assignments and Re-election in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 996-1007, September.
    2. Polsby, Nelson W. & Gallaher, Miriam & Rundquist, Barry Spencer, 1969. "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U. S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 787-807, November.
    3. Hall, Richard L. & Grofman, Bernard, 1990. "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1149-1166, December.
    4. Cooper, Joseph & Brady, David W., 1981. "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 411-425, June.
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