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The Supply of University Enrollments: University Administrators as Utility Maximizing Bureaucrats


  • Coates, Dennis
  • Humphreys, Brad R


The supply of enrollments in higher education has received relatively little attention in both theoretical and empirical economic research. To address this, we formulate and test a model of the supply of enrollments in higher education in which administrators are modeled as utility maximizing bureaucrats. We find evidence that individual presidents and provosts have a significant effect on enrollment supply and faculty demand in a panel of eleven public colleges and universities in Maryland from 1988 to 1996, implying that institutions have enough market power to permit the preferences of administrators to influence enrollment supply and faculty demand. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Coates, Dennis & Humphreys, Brad R, 2002. "The Supply of University Enrollments: University Administrators as Utility Maximizing Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(3-4), pages 365-392, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:110:y:2002:i:3-4:p:365-92

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kuo, Jenn-Shyong & Ho, Yi-Cheng, 2008. "The cost efficiency impact of the university operation fund on public universities in Taiwan," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 603-612, October.
    2. Singell, Larry D. & Tang, Hui-Hsuan, 2013. "Pomp and circumstance: University presidents and the role of human capital in determining who leads U.S. research institutions," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 219-233.
    3. Singell, Larry Jr. & Stone, Joe A., 2007. "For whom the Pell tolls: The response of university tuition to federal grants-in-aid," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 285-295, June.
    4. Dennis Leyden & Albert Link, 2013. "Knowledge spillovers, collective entrepreneurship, and economic growth: the role of universities," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 797-817, December.
    5. Philippe Cyrenne & Hugh Grant, 2012. "Modeling the Optimization Problem of a Public University," Departmental Working Papers 2012-02, The University of Winnipeg, Department of Economics.
    6. Leyden, Dennis & Link, Albert N., 2012. "Knowledge Spillovers, Collective Entrepreneurship, & Economic Growth: The Role of Universities," UNCG Economics Working Papers 12-8, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Economics.

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