Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment
In a series of experiments we show that people learn to play the efficient outcome in an open-ended rent-seeking game. This result persists despite quite different experiment environments and designs, like different propensities of competition, group sizes etc., and is interpretable as a resolution of the so-called Tullock paradox which states that real-world rent-seeking expenditures are much lower than what the standard rent-seeking model predicts. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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