On the Formation of Family Structures
Hitherto, models of family economics focus on explaining the organization of monogamous and polygynous family patterns. A third existing marriage pattern, polyandrous marriages, has been neglected. This paper shows that--in contrast to the common view--a polyandrous marriage may be individually rational. I consider a game theoretic model of a subsistence economy whose members maximize their personal reproductive success. In this model, all three family formations can appear as equilibrium solutions. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 105 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
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