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Enhancing Efficiency or Crying Over Spilled Milk: The Benefits of Reform

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  • Poitras, Marc
  • Sutter, Daniel

Abstract

We analyze the welfare gains from the reform of existing government-induced distortions. Our results provide support for policies aimed at eliminating monopoly and other types of economic distortion. Welfare gains over the status quo exist whenever deregulation occurs. The threat of deregulation can induce a monopoly or cartel to modify its behavior, so a reform policy can prove beneficial even if reform does not actually occur. Optimal policy with commitment in fact allows a monopoly to deter deregulation. The possibility of reregulation does not reverse our results; the per period welfare gain from reform remains undiminished. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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  • Poitras, Marc & Sutter, Daniel, 2000. "Enhancing Efficiency or Crying Over Spilled Milk: The Benefits of Reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 23-40, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:105:y:2000:i:1-2:p:23-40
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    Cited by:

    1. Lee, Sanghack & Cheong, Kiwoong, 2005. "Rent dissipation and social benefit in regulated entry contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 205-219, March.
    2. Barrachina, Alex & Forner-Carreras, Teresa, 2022. "Market must be defended: The role of counter-espionage policy in protecting domestic market welfare," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    3. Caporale, Tony & Leirer, Jonathan, 2010. "Take the money and run: Political turnover, rent-seeking and economic growth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 406-412, November.
    4. Edward López, 2010. "Who will deregulate the deregulators?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 379-384, March.

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