Competing Bureaus and Politicians: A Compliance Approach to the Diversion of Public Funds
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- Christoph Gwosć & Gregor Van Der Beek, 2003. "Principles for a European Union's Public Debt," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 23-37, March.
- Silvia Fedeli & Michele Santoni, 2001.
"Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 203-229, November.
- Michele Santoni & Silvia Fedeli, 2000. "Endogenous Institutions in Bureaucratic Compliance Games," Departmental Working Papers 2000-03, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Silvia Fedeli & Michele Santoni, 2006. "The Government's Choice of Bureaucratic Organisation: An Application to Italian State Museums," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 30(1), pages 41-72, March.
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