Negotiated tariffs in free entry oligopoly under integrated markets
Using the Nash bargaining approach, this paper analyzes the negotiation of tariffs between two countries in free-entry oligopolies under integrated markets. Employing a symmetric model with linear demand and cost functions, the paper shows that for both countries Pareto-efficient negotiated tariffs are larger than the tariffs at the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative tariff game (tariff war) in which each country imposes its optimum tariff. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Copeland, Brian R & Tower, Edward & Webb, Michael A, 1989. "On Negotiated Quotas, Tariffs, and Transfers," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(4), pages 774-88, October.
- Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983.
"A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 313-321, November.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1980. "A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade," Working Papers 405, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1982. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," Working Papers 513, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Markusen, James R. & Venables, Anthony J, 1986.
"Trade Policy with Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition: Contradictory Results from Competing Assumptions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
120, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Markusen, James R. & Venables, Anthony J., 1988. "Trade policy with increasing returns and imperfect competition : Contradictory results from competing assumptions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 299-316, May.
- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-53, March.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," Working Papers 517, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Horstmann, Ignatius J. & Markusen, James R., 1986. "Up the average cost curve: Inefficient entry and the new protectionism," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3-4), pages 225-247, May.
- Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Venables, Anthony J., 1985. "Trade and trade policy with imperfect competition: The case of identical products and free entry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-19, August.
- Krugman, Paul R, 1987. "Is Free Trade Passe?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 131-44, Fall.
- Chan, Kenneth S., 1988. "Trade negotiations in a Nash bargaining model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 353-363, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:2:y:1991:i:2:p:165-181. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.