Implicit contracts with effort incentives
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Volume (Year): 52 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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- Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Theories of Wage Rigidity," NBER Working Papers 1442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dilip Mookherjee, 1986. "Involuntary Unemployment and Worker Moral Hazard," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 739-754.
- Milne, Frank & Shefrin, H M, 1988. "Ex Post Efficiency and Ex Post Welfare: Some Fundamental Considerations," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 55(217), pages 63-79, February.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
- Ross M. Starr, 1973. "Optimal Production and Allocation under Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 81-95.
- Brown, Murray & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1984. "Underemployment and normal leisure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 157-163.
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