How Much Tax Coordination in the European Union?
This paper examines the trade-offs between tax autonomy and fiscal neutrality that the Member States of the European Union face in coordinating their taxes on consumption, labor and capital. One of the main messages is that in many cases tax reform should precede tax harmonization, mainly because the costs of distortions within Member States may be greater than the gains from reducing intergovernmental tax competition. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 10 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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