Listing Contract Length and Time on Market
Miceli (1989) in a search for the optimal time to allow a broker to market property provides a theoretical model which posits that the principal (seller) may use the length of the listing contract to motivate the agent (listing broker) to better align incentives. Expanding slightly on Miceli, this present work predicts that longer time allotted the broker to market residential property will decrease broker effort resulting in lower search intensity and eventually a longer marketing span for property, ceteris paribus. This prediction is borne out across three empirical modeling methodologies commonly used in time on market studies.
Volume (Year): 32 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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