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From A Parliamentary Assembly To A European Parliament: An Unfinished Process

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  • Ioana Antoaneta DODI

    (PhD, Associate Professor, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania)

Abstract

The Parliamentary Assembly of the European Communities was the precursory body of the European Parliament, but it lacked the legitimacy the latter would gain starting with 1979, the year when the first European elections were held. The two entities differ in many ways, such as the internal organization, the competences and the connections with other European institutions, but the fundamental difference is the one that also determined the rest of the previously mentioned aspects, specifically the way their members were appointed. Although this aspect may seem solved, it will not be so until the suffrage for the European Parliament will not only be direct, universal and secret, but also accessible, assuring all interested stakeholders the same fair conditions for participation, thus eliminating all formal and informal obstacles for independent or party candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Ioana Antoaneta DODI, 2016. "From A Parliamentary Assembly To A European Parliament: An Unfinished Process," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 8(1), pages 57-73, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:jes:wpaper:y:2016:v:8:i:1:p:57-73
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hix, Simon, 2002. "Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 259-280, April.
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