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The Effects of Group Composition and Social Preference Heterogeneity in a Public Goods Game: An Agent-Based Simulation

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Abstract

Behavioural economics highlights the role of social preferences in economic decisions. Further, populations are heterogeneous, suggesting that the composition of social preference types within a group may impact the ability to sustain voluntary public goods contributions. We conduct agent-based simulations of contributions in a public goods game, varying group composition and the weight individuals place on their beliefs versus their underlying social preference type. We then examine the effect of each of these factors on contributions. We find that social preference heterogeneity negatively impacts provision over a wide range of the parameter space, even controlling for the share of types in a group.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Lucas & Angela C.M. de Oliveira & Sheheryar Banuri, 2014. "The Effects of Group Composition and Social Preference Heterogeneity in a Public Goods Game: An Agent-Based Simulation," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 17(3), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2012-139-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Sergio F. Góngora y Moreno & J. Octavio Gutierrez-Garcia, 2018. "Collective action in organizational structures," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-33, March.
    2. Castañeda, Gonzalo & Chávez-Juárez, Florian & Guerrero, Omar A., 2018. "How do governments determine policy priorities? Studying development strategies through spillover networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 335-361.
    3. William D. Tilson & Thomas K. Duncan & Daniel Farhat, 2020. "An Agent-Based Model of Ethnocentrism and the Unintended Consequences of Violence," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 483-503, June.

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