Normative Reputation and the Costs of Compliance
In this paper, the role of normative reputation in reducing the costs of complying with norms will be explored. In previous simulations (Conte & Castelfranchi 1995), in contrast to a traditional view of norms as means for increasing co-ordination among agents, the effects of normative and non-normative strategies in the control of aggression among agents in a common environment was confronted. Normative strategies were found to reduce aggression to a much greater extent than non-normative strategies, and also to afford the highest average strength and the lowest polarisation of strength among the agents. The present study explores the effects of the interaction between populations following different criteria for aggression control. In such a situation the normative agents alone bear the cost of norms, due to their less aggressive behaviour, while other agents benefit from their presence. Equity is then restored by raising the cost of aggression through the introduction of agents' reputation. This allows normative agents to avoid respecting the cheaters' private property, and to impose a price for transgression. The relevance of knowledge communication is then emphasised by allowing neighbour normative agents to communicate. In particular, the spreading of agents' reputation via communication allows normative agents to co-operate without deliberation at the expense of non-normative agents, thereby redistributing the costs of normative strategies.
Volume (Year): 1 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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