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Managerial Bargaining Power in the Determination of Compensation Contracts and Corporate Investment

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  • Stoughton, Neal M
  • Talmor, Eli

Abstract

This paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision. The model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position. Using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information, a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak, while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power. The model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts. Our results are related to the empirical literature on pay-performance sensitivities. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Stoughton, Neal M & Talmor, Eli, 1999. "Managerial Bargaining Power in the Determination of Compensation Contracts and Corporate Investment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 69-93, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:40:y:1999:i:1:p:69-93
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eli Talmor & James S. Wallace, 1998. "Computer Industry Executives: An Analysis of the New Barons' Compensation," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 9(4), pages 398-414, December.
    2. Bardsley, P., 2001. "Recursive Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 797, The University of Melbourne.
    3. Liu, Yixin & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2010. "The effect of CEO power on bond ratings and yields," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 744-762, September.
    4. Gregory Sierra & Eli Talmor & James Wallace, 2006. "An Examination of Multiple Governance Forces within Bank Holding Companies," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 105-123, April.
    5. Peter Bardsley & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2001. "Rat Races and Glass Ceilings- Career Paths in Organizations," Working Papers 200106, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    6. Jiraporn, Pornsit & Chintrakarn, Pandej & Kim, Young S., 2012. "Analyst following, staggered boards, and managerial entrenchment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 3091-3100.
    7. Gregory E. Sierra & Eli Talmor & James S. Wallace, 2004. "A unified analysis of executive pay: the case of the banking industry," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2004-02, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    8. repec:eee:pacfin:v:50:y:2018:i:c:p:126-143 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Cuny, Charles J. & Talmor, Eli, 2007. "A theory of private equity turnarounds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 629-646, September.

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