IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/hom/homoec/v15y1998p71-92.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Social Norms, Moral Commitment, and Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Kritikos

    (Fakultõt f³r Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Europa-Universitõt Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Frankfurt/Oder, Germany)

  • Georg Meran

    (Fachbereich Wirtschaft und Management, Technische Universitõt Berlin, Berlin, Germany)

Abstract

Normative Game theory does not consider cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) as a serious strategy. Recent research has, therefore, introduced nonmonetary values to explain why individuals may choose to cooperate in PD-Games. It is not explained, however, where the values come from. Under the assumption of endogenous preferences we show that educating individuals towards a moral commitment can change preferences in a way that a deliberate willingness for cooperation is created. For that we provide a utility function where the compliance to social norms generates utility. Accordingly, we regard the decisions of morally committed individuals as rational.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Kritikos & Georg Meran, 1998. "Social Norms, Moral Commitment, and Cooperation," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 15, pages 71-92.
    • Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1998:p:71-92
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2007. "The economics of solidarity: A conceptual framework," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 73-89, February.
    2. Kritikos, Alexander & Bolle, Friedel, 2001. "Distributional concerns: equity- or efficiency-oriented?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 333-338, December.
    3. Friedel Bolle & Alexander Kritikos, 2006. "Reciprocity, Altruism, Solidarity: A Dynamic Model," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 60(4), pages 371-394, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1998:p:71-92. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sohamde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.