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Analysis of Water Rights Allocation in Heilongjiang Province Based on Stackelberg Game Model and Entropy Right Method

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  • Kaiming Lu

    (College of Heilongjiang River and Lake Chief, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China)

  • Shang Yang

    (College of Heilongjiang River and Lake Chief, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China)

  • Zhilei Wu

    (College of Heilongjiang River and Lake Chief, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China)

  • Zhenjiang Si

    (College of Heilongjiang River and Lake Chief, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China)

Abstract

This study compares the Stackelberg game model and the entropy weight method for allocating intercity water rights in Heilongjiang Province (2014–2021). The entropy method objectively determines indicator weights, while the Stackelberg framework simulates leader–follower interactions between the water authority and users to balance efficiency and satisfaction. Under the same total water rights cap, the Stackelberg scheme achieves a comprehensive benefit of CNY 14,966 billion, 4% higher than the entropy method (CNY 14,436 billion). The results and comprehensive benefits of the two schemes are close to each other in the cities of Qiqihaer, Daqing, Hegang, etc., but the allocation method of the game theory is more in line with the practical needs and can meet the water demand of each region, and the entropy right method is more useful for the cities of Jiamusi, Jixi, and Heihe, while for other cities the water rights allocation appeared to be unreasonable. While the entropy approach is transparent and data-driven, it lacks dynamic feedback and may under- or over-allocate in rapidly changing contexts. The Stackelberg model adapts to varying demands, better aligning allocations with actual needs. We discuss parameter justification, sensitivity, governance assumptions, and potential extensions, including hybrid modeling, climate change integration, stakeholder participation, and real-time monitoring. The findings provide methodological insights for adaptive and equitable water allocation in regions with strong regulatory capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaiming Lu & Shang Yang & Zhilei Wu & Zhenjiang Si, 2025. "Analysis of Water Rights Allocation in Heilongjiang Province Based on Stackelberg Game Model and Entropy Right Method," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(16), pages 1-23, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:16:p:7407-:d:1725669
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Li Pan & Xudong Chen & Lu Zhao & Anran Xiao, 2019. "Does Information Asymmetry Impact Sub-Regions’ Cooperation of Regional Water Resource Allocation?," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(21), pages 1-16, November.
    2. Harold Houba & Françeska Tomori, 2023. "Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-9, July.
    3. Janjua, Shahmir & An-Vo, Duc-Anh & Reardon-Smith, Kathryn & Mushtaq, Shahbaz, 2024. "Resolving water security conflicts in agriculture by a cooperative Nash bargaining approach," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 306(C).
    4. Kangli Xiang & Jinyu Chen & Li Yang & Jianfa Wu & Pengjia Shi, 2024. "Equilibrium Interaction Strategies for Integrated Energy System Incorporating Demand-Side Management Based on Stackelberg Game Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 17(14), pages 1-24, July.
    5. de Frutos Cachorro, Julia & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Tidball, Mabel, 2024. "Commitment vs. noncommitment behaviors in natural resource conflicts: A case study of groundwater resources," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuzhi Shi & Jiwen Huang & Mingyang Li & Rui Wang & Lili Liu & Zhenxiang Xu & Yanfang Diao, 2025. "Sectoral and Regional Allocation of Initial Water Rights of Reservoirs: A Two-Dimensional Method Based on Matter-Element Extension Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(19), pages 1-23, September.

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