Lavoro e sistema di ricompense: il caso delle cooperative sociali italiane
Labour and Incentives: The Italian Social Cooperatives Case (by Marco Musella, Roberta Troisi) - This paper tries to contribute to the debate about the nature of job relationship in social cooperative enterprise. The essay has been focused on an incentive system tied to the work activity, which should be richer if compared to its traditional shape in economics. This different incentive system has been presented in terms of demand of incentives from the workers and supply of them from enterprises. Moreover with the aim of enhancing the design of incentive system the paper has drawn on organization theory ideas of incentives as alternative to control when the work activity is hard to keep under control. In this line, it has tried to demonstrate the effectiveness of an incentive system based on the two following assumptions: first of all, where the nature of the performance both as effort and outcome makes the control unsuitable, it is better to turn the process of monitoring into a process which effectively eliminates goal incongruence between individuals. Besides, a way to eliminate this incongruence, can count on an incentive system which has as point of reference the effort instead of the outcome, and is relied upon a demonstrated incentive to self-control. JEL Classification: D64, D23, J32, L31, M54
Volume (Year): 2007/93 (2007)
Issue (Month): 93 ()
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