IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fan/polipo/vhtml10.3280-poli2012-003008.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Public funding in the Italian transport sector. A roadmap for policy-makers

Author

Listed:
  • Paolo Beria
  • Marco Ponti

Abstract

Public money flowing in or out of the transport sector is one of the most powerful drivers of its evolution. The paper aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the revenue and expenditure of the Italian State and the local administrations for the Italian transport system. Based on the available resources, the paper quantifies the subsidies and the contracts to support investments, network maintenance and service delivery, as well as the value of the taxes generated. The analysis is completed by an historical background. The results indicate that road transport generates more in taxes than it receives in the form of free public roads (a net of over thirty-two billion euros per year). In contrast, the bus and rail systems receive subsidies valued at approximately thirteen billion euros per year, inclusive of new infrastructure. The other modes of transport benefit from relatively lower resources. The paper is completed by a discussion on the tools available for a more informed socio-economic assessment of this expenditure, by possible alternative scenarios of public expenditure and their effects on patronage and with some policy indications.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Beria & Marco Ponti, 2012. "Public funding in the Italian transport sector. A roadmap for policy-makers," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2012(3), pages 137-169.
  • Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/poli2012-003008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=46225&Tipo=ArticoloPDF
    Download Restriction: Single articles can be downloaded buying download credits, for info: http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/inglese_download_credit.asp

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Encaoua, David & Jacquemin, Alexis & Moreaux, Michel, 1986. "Global Market Power and Diversification," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(382), pages 525-533, June.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
    3. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. " Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March.
    4. Dixon, Huw David, 1994. "Inefficient Diversification in Multi-market Oligopoly with Diseconomies of Scope," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(242), pages 213-219, May.
    5. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1994. "Benefits of Narrow Business Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1330-1349, December.
    6. Lang, Larry H P & Stulz, Rene M, 1994. "Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1248-1280, December.
    7. Bailey, Elizabeth E & Friedlaender, Ann F, 1982. "Market Structure and Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 1024-1048, September.
    8. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli, 1996. " Bustup Takeovers of Value-Destroying Diversified Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1175-1200, September.
    9. Hilke, John C & Nelson, Philip B, 1988. "Diversification and Predation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 107-111, September.
    10. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    11. Scott, John T., 1989. "Purposive diversification as a motive for merger," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 35-47, March.
    12. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 605-617, Autumn.
    13. Deneffe, Daniel, 1993. "Cost externalities and corporate diversification," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 261-282, June.
    14. Denis, David J & Denis, Diane K & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. " Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 135-160, March.
    15. David J. Teece, 2003. "Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Essays In Technology Management And Policy Selected Papers of David J Teece, chapter 15, pages 419-446 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    16. Roller, Lars-Hendrik & Tombak, Mihkel M, 1990. "Strategic Choice of Flexible Production Technologies and Welfare Implications," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 417-431, June.
    17. Mantell, Edmund H., 1998. "The effect on firm output after its acquisition by a pure conglomerate," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 487-501, September.
    18. Scott,John T., 2005. "Purposive Diversification and Economic Performance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521022583, March.
    19. Yongmin Chen, 1997. "Multidimensional Signalling and Diversification," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 168-187, Spring.
    20. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    21. Levy, David T, 1989. "Predation, Firm-Specific Assets and Diversification," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 227-233, December.
    22. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    23. Teece, David J., 1980. "Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 223-247, September.
    24. Choi, Yoon K. & Merville, Larry J., 1995. "Monitoring, diversification and managerial incentive contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 27-33, January.
    25. Zhang, Anming & Zhang, Yimin, 1996. "Stability of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium: The multiproduct case," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 441-462.
    26. Williamson, Oliver E., 1992. "Markets, hierarchies, and the modern corporation: An unfolding perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 335-352, May.
    27. Cynthia A. Montgomery & Birger Wernerfelt, 1988. "Diversification, Ricardian Rents, and Tobin's q," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 623-632, Winter.
    28. Servaes, Henri, 1996. " The Value of Diversification during the Conglomerate Merger Wave," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1201-1225, September.
    29. Ghemawat, Pankaj & Khanna, Tarun, 1998. "The Nature of Diversified Business Groups: A Research Design and Two Case Studies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 35-61, March.
    30. Patel, Pari & Pavitt, Keith, 1997. "The technological competencies of the world's largest firms: Complex and path-dependent, but not much variety," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 141-156, May.
    31. Kathleen M. Hagerty & Daniel R. Siegel, 1988. "On the Observational Equivalence of Managerial Contracts Under Conditions of Moral Hazard and Self-Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 425-428.
    32. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1992. "Mutual Forbearance in Experimental Conglomerate Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 395-414, Autumn.
    33. Teece, David J. & Rumelt, Richard & Dosi, Giovanni & Winter, Sidney, 1994. "Understanding corporate coherence : Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-30, January.
    34. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    35. Amar Bhide, 1990. "Reversing Corporate Diversification," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 3(2), pages 70-81.
    36. Lars-Hendrick Röller & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 1996. "Asymmetry in Cournot Duopoly," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-23, CIRANO.
    37. Cynthia A. Montgomery, 1994. "Corporate Diversificaton," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 163-178, Summer.
    38. Panzar, John C & Willig, Robert D, 1981. "Economies of Scope," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 268-272, May.
    39. Debra J. Aron, 1988. "Ability, Moral Hazard, Firm Size, and Diversification," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 72-87, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trasporti; infrastrutture; ferrovia; trasporto pubblico; spesa pubblica; tasse; analisi costi-benefici;

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • R42 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance; Transportation Planning

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/poli2012-003008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Angelo Ventriglia). General contact details of provider: http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/sommario.asp?IDRivista=13 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.