IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/epw/politi/v5y2026i2id8173.html

Paradox of Institutional Responsibility

Author

Listed:
  • Sumit Kumar

Abstract

Of all the ideas that came to the fore during the time of enlightenment in Europe, none has had a more telling impact on the lives of the people across the globe as much as Democracy. Even in the regions where oppressive dictatorial regimes or despotic kingdoms exist, the ideals of democracy still have a large impact on the power struggles and exercise of authority within the state infrastructure. However, these ideals of democracy are not perfect in themselves and are riddled with paradoxes which cannot be resolved without breaching these democratic ideals themselves. In his attempt to resolve the paradox of politics Rousseau created the fiction of a lawgiver which as pointed out above was a breach of the ideas on which democracy is established. The paradox of democratic legitimacy remains another such paradox which cannot be resolved without replacing democracy with populism or constitutionalism. Institutions like the legislature, judiciary, executive, police, military, media, civil society and the like, collectively define a state. At the very same time, these institutions that constitute the state are also embedded in the society. These paradoxes of democracy that get realized into the public institutions pass on through to our society and have considerable politico-legal impact on our society. Democratic society reacts to these paradoxical situations in different ways, either giving rise to populist totalitarianism like fascism or scientific totalitarianism like socialism/communism. This paper deals with the critical analysis of the various democratic paradoxes how they filter down to our society, and how they are institutionally realized creating the paradox of Institutional Responsibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Sumit Kumar, 2026. "Paradox of Institutional Responsibility," European Journal of Law and Political Science, European Open Science, vol. 5(2), pages 14-22, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:epw:politi:v:5:y:2026:i:2:id:8173
    DOI: 10.24018/ejpolitics.2026.5.2.8173
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://eu-opensci.org/index.php/politics/article/view/8173
    File Function: Abstract page
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://eu-opensci.org/index.php/politics/article/download/8173/14035
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.24018/ejpolitics.2026.5.2.8173?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ostrom, Vincent, 1975. "Public Choice Theory: A New Approach to Institutional Economics," 1975 Annual Meeting, August 10-13, Columbus, Ohio 284138, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Honig, Bonnie, 2007. "Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-17, February.
    3. Vincent Ostrom, 1975. "Public Choice Theory: A New Approach to Institutional Economics," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 57(5), pages 844-850.
    4. David P. Myatt, 2007. "On the Theory of Strategic Voting -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(1), pages 255-281.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Smathers, Webb M. Jr. & Broder, Josef M. & Porter, John F., 1980. "Distributional Consequences Of Consolidated Community Service Provision," 1980 Annual Meeting, July 27-30, Urbana-Champaign, Illinois 278894, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. David Lowery, 2013. "Remembering Vincent Ostrom: unhorsing a dominant paradigm," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 163-171, March.
    3. DEMİREL Demokaan, 2025. "Impact of New Institutional Economics on New Public Management," Foundations of Management, Sciendo, vol. 17(1), pages 421-440.
    4. Liu, Karen, 1981. "Developing A Prototype Model For The World Grains, Oilseeds And Livestock Model," 1981 Annual Meeting, July 26-29, Clemson, South Carolina 279319, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Ranney, Christine K. & Kushman, John E., 1987. "A Study of the Interdependent Food Stamp Program Participation and Food Demand Decisions," Research Reports 251940, University of California, Davis, Giannini Foundation.
    6. Massimo Cervesato, 2025. "Why Bloomington is not in Virginia: Contrasting the Social Ontologies of the Ostroms and Buchanan," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 25017, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    7. Josef Broder & A. Schmid, 1983. "Public choice in local judicial systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 7-19, January.
    8. Trang Hoang, 2022. "Fiscal competition and state pension reforms," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 41-70, September.
    9. Spenkuch, Jörg, 2013. "On the Extent of Strategic Voting," MPRA Paper 50198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2016. "Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 114-128.
    11. Bouton, Laurent & Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    12. Elkind, Edith & Grandi, Umberto & Rossi, Francesca & Slinko, Arkadii, 2020. "Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 193-205.
    13. Alastair Smith & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Tom LaGatta, 2017. "Group incentives and rational voting1," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 299-326, April.
    14. Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2012. "Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 681-700.
    15. Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle, 2012. "Which Way to Cooperate," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(563), pages 1042-1068, September.
    16. Costel Andonie & Daniel Diermeier, 2022. "Electoral Institutions with impressionable voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 683-733, October.
    17. Hans Agné, 2008. "We the People and the Others: The Co-founding of Democratic States," The Constitutionalism Web-Papers p0034, University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science.
    18. Hughes, Niall, 2016. "Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 51-93.
    19. Antoine Loeper & Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2014. "Influential Opinion Leaders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(581), pages 1147-1167, December.
    20. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol, 2017. "Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 132-150.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:epw:politi:v:5:y:2026:i:2:id:8173. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://eu-opensci.org/index.php/politics .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.