IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eme/ijmfpp/v11y2015i3p308-328.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Board independence and the quality of board monitoring: evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Xiaohui Wu
  • Hui Li

Abstract

Purpose - – In 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission required that at least one-third of the members of corporate boards of directors come from outside the organization. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of this change of regulation on corporate governance in China. In particular, the authors examine whether the increase in the proportion of outsider directors can increase the monitoring quality of the board. Design/methodology/approach - – The basic empirical methodology is a logit regression in which the dependent variable is a binary variable that represents one of the three “negative events” identified as the indicators of poor monitoring quality. The independent variables are firm-level control variables. Findings - – Using Chinese stock data from 1999 to 2005, the authors find that the resulting increase in board independence has reduced the occurrence of connected transactions and violations such as financial statement fraud, illegal insider trading, and asset misappropriation. However, this positive effect of board independence is not uniform across firms. The authors show that a higher degree of fundamental uncertainty in a firm impedes the effectiveness of board independence. The authors also document that the level of board independence is positively associated with firm performance, as measured either in stock market return or accounting return. Originality/value - – In this paper, the authors aim to investigate the effectiveness of outsider directors in a more direct way than has previous research. The authors measure the improvement in the quality of board monitoring by the reduction of the likelihood of those corporate events that could reduce firms’ value. In particular, the authors examine the relationship between the board independence and the occurrence of “negative” corporate events in China. To the best of the knowledge, this is the first study that explores the link between board independence and the probabilities of these events.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaohui Wu & Hui Li, 2015. "Board independence and the quality of board monitoring: evidence from China," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 11(3), pages 308-328, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijmfpp:v:11:y:2015:i:3:p:308-328
    DOI: 10.1108/IJMF-07-2014-0101
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJMF-07-2014-0101/full/html?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJMF-07-2014-0101/full/pdf?utm_source=repec&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=repec
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1108/IJMF-07-2014-0101?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dah, Mustafa A. & Frye, Melissa B., 2017. "Is board compensation excessive?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 566-585.
    2. Lasuli Bakalikwira & Juma Bananuka & Twaha Kaawaase Kigongo & Doreen Musimenta & Veronica Mukyala, 2017. "Accountability in the public health care systems: A developing economy perspective," Cogent Business & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 1334995-133, January.
    3. Ding, Wenzhi & Levine, Ross & Lin, Chen & Xie, Wensi, 2021. "Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 802-830.
    4. Xia, Li & Gao, Shuo & Wei, Jiuchang & Ding, Qiying, 2022. "Government subsidy and corporate green innovation - Does board governance play a role?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    5. Bu, Luofan & Chan, Kam C. & Choi, Ahrum & Zhou, Gaoguang, 2021. "Talented inside directors and corporate social responsibility: A tale of two roles," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    6. Li, Tianshi & Yang, Tina & Zhu, Jigao, 2022. "Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from independent directors’ voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    7. Chien-Ming Huang & Wei Yang & Ren-Qing Zeng, 2020. "Analysis on the Efficiency of Risk Management in the Chinese Listed Companies," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(10), pages 1-13, October.
    8. Michel Sayumwe, 2019. "Corporate Governance: An Overview. From Creation of Value for Shareholders by the Board to the Duality Role of Its Chairperson," Journal of Business Administration Research, Journal of Business Administration Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 8(1), pages 40-51, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Firm performance; Violation; Board independence; Connected transaction; Fundamental uncertainty; Outsider directors; G30; G32; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:ijmfpp:v:11:y:2015:i:3:p:308-328. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Emerald Support (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.