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Instituciones, federalismo defensor de mercados y Estado de las Autonomías Un análisis de segunda generación

  • Caballero, Gonzalo

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Historia e Instituciones Económicas, Facultad de Economía, Universidad de Vigo)

The New Institutional Economic has propeled the analysis of institutions on new theoretical bases in the economic science. The interest in institutions has developed a second generation of economic theories of federalism. This article analyses the Spanish model of decentralization of the State of Autonomies from this new theoretical approach, studying the relationship between institutions, policy-making and economy across the market-preserving federalism hypothesis for the Spanish case. This hypothesis shows two sources of inefficiency of the Spanish federal structure in the function of dividing political power and preserving market. On the one hand, the financing system constituted a “fiscal pact with the devil” that prevented the fiscal responsibility. On the other, the Senate acted as a “blunt veto player” whose governance constituted a self-enforcing situation.// La nueva economía institucional ha impulsado el análisis de las instituciones de nuevas bases teóricas en el seno de la ciencia económica. La atención a las instituciones ha permitido el desarrollo de una segunda generación de teorías económicas del federalismo. Este artículo analiza el modelo español de descentralización del Estado de las Autonomías desde este nuevo enfoque teórico, estudiando la relación entre instituciones, policy-making y economía por medio de la hipótesis de un federalismo defensor de mercados para el caso español. Esta hipótesis presenta dos fuentes de ineficiencia de la estructura federal española en su función de división del poder político y defensa de los mercados. Por una parte, el sistema de financiación autonómica constituyó un “pacto fiscal con el diablo” que limitó la corresponsabilidad fiscal. Por otra, la estructura institucional del Senado lo convirtió en un blunt veto player, cuya fórmula de gobernación constituye una situación self-enforcing que dificulta la reforma.

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Article provided by Fondo de Cultura Económica in its journal El Trimestre Económico.

Volume (Year): LXXII (2) (2005)
Issue (Month): 286 (abril-junio)
Pages: 283-327

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Handle: RePEc:elt:journl:v:72:y:2005:i:286:p:283-327
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.fondodeculturaeconomica.com/

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