Worker Motivation, Wages, and Bilateral Market Power in Nonunion Labor Markets
This paper investigates bilateral market power in labor markets by merging an effort or labor discipline model with a turnover cost model. The effort model indicates unilateral employer power over workers; adding costly turnover allows for bilateral power in employment relationships. Systematic differences in exogenous determinates of the cost of job loss to workers and replacement costs to firms can help explain observed patterns of wage differentiation, including distinctions between segments of dual labor markets, interindustry wage differentials, the response of skill-based differentials to technological change and international competition, race- and gender-based differentials, and regional and national changes in unemployment.
Volume (Year): 30 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (Fall)
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