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Reproductive skew can provide a net advantage in both conditional and unconditional social interactions

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  • Bao, Ming
  • Wild, Geoff

Abstract

We revisit a model for the evolution of costly social behaviour in the presence of reproductive skew. The model population is structured into groups, and reproductive skew is captured by assuming individuals adopt one of two social roles (dominant/subordinate). Unlike previous work, we adopt an ultimate perspective by tracking a mutant allele over the entire course of an invasion. Our main analysis applies the theory of branching processes, but a parallel analysis using the inclusive-fitness approach is also provided. Our first two results are modifications of known inequalities describing selective advantages for behaviours expressed conditional upon social status. We find that altruistic subordinate individuals are favoured more readily than previously thought; spiteful dominant individuals, however, are favoured less readily. Secondly, we identify the condition under which unconditional altruism (performed by both dominant and subordinate) will be adaptive. Our third main result shows that increasing the strength of selection can also change the range of parameters over which costly social behaviours are favoured. We find that stronger selection makes it relatively easier for subordinate altruism to emerge, but more difficult for dominant spite and unconditional altruism to occur. We discuss the possible implications of our results for human social evolution.

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  • Bao, Ming & Wild, Geoff, 2012. "Reproductive skew can provide a net advantage in both conditional and unconditional social interactions," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 200-208.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:82:y:2012:i:3:p:200-208
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2012.06.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter D. Taylor & Troy Day & Geoff Wild, 2007. "Evolution of cooperation in a finite homogeneous graph," Nature, Nature, vol. 447(7143), pages 469-472, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W. & Lehmann, Laurent, 2020. "Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    2. Alger, Ingela & Lehmann, Laurent & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Evolution of preferences in group-structured populations: genes, guns, and culture," TSE Working Papers 18-888, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2019.
    3. McAvoy, Alex & Fraiman, Nicolas & Hauert, Christoph & Wakeley, John & Nowak, Martin A., 2018. "Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 72-84.

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