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Affirmative action in recruitment decisions: do penalties mitigate recruitment bias?

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  • Bandyopadhyay, Anwesha

Abstract

This paper presents a laboratory experiment modelled on recruitment decisions of firms, incorporating gender and productivity as variables. The primary objective of this study is to investigate whether affirmative action policies contribute to an increase in the representation of women in higher-level positions and to analyse the impact of these policies on team productivity. Furthermore, we have designed the experiment to compare binding and non-binding affirmative action policies to ascertain their relative effectiveness in addressing recruitment bias. The findings indicate that, although both male and female team leaders demonstrate bias against female candidates, the implementation of a monetary penalty is the most effective strategy for mitigating gender bias among team leaders. Additionally, the results suggest that affirmative action policies do not have a detrimental effect on team productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Bandyopadhyay, Anwesha, 2026. "Affirmative action in recruitment decisions: do penalties mitigate recruitment bias?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:121:y:2026:i:c:s2214804326000315
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2026.102540
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    JEL classification:

    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
    • J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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