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Emergent cooperation amongst competing agents in minority games

Author

Listed:
  • Dhar, Deepak
  • Sasidevan, V.
  • Chakrabarti, Bikas K.

Abstract

We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives every day, and there is a reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to guess the choice others will make, based only on the past history of the number of people choosing the two alternatives. We describe a simple probabilistic strategy using which the agents, acting independently, and trying to maximize their individual expected payoff, still achieve a very efficient overall utilization of resources, and the average deviation of the number of happy agents per day from the maximum possible can be made O(Nϵ), for any ϵ>0. We also show that a single agent does not expect to gain by not following the strategy.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhar, Deepak & Sasidevan, V. & Chakrabarti, Bikas K., 2011. "Emergent cooperation amongst competing agents in minority games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(20), pages 3477-3485.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:390:y:2011:i:20:p:3477-3485
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2011.05.014
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shu-Heng Chen & Umberto Gostoli, 2017. "Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(1), pages 59-93, April.
    2. Biswas, Soumyajyoti & Mandal, Amit Kr, 2021. "Parallel Minority Game and it’s application in movement optimization during an epidemic," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 561(C).
    3. Li-Xin Zhong & Wen-Juan Xu & Fei Ren & Yong-Dong Shi, 2012. "Coupled effects of market impact and asymmetric sensitivity in financial markets," Papers 1209.3399, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2013.
    4. Zhong, Li-Xin & Xu, Wen-Juan & Ren, Fei & Shi, Yong-Dong, 2013. "Coupled effects of market impact and asymmetric sensitivity in financial markets," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(9), pages 2139-2149.
    5. Hardik Rajpal & Deepak Dhar, 2018. "Achieving Perfect Coordination amongst Agents in the Co-Action Minority Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-13, May.

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