Optimal cities with indivisibility in production and interactions between firms
A spatial model of cities is constructed by combining interaction costs between firms with indivisibility in production. The optimal allocation requires Pigouvian subsidies to firms and the externality version of the Henry George Theorem is obtained: at the optimal city size, the total Pigouvian subsidy equals the total differential land rent in a city. We also obtain conditions under which monocentric configuration is optimal and perform comparative statics concerning changes in various parameters on the optimal city size.
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