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Comment on “Imitation processes with small mutations” [J. Econ. Theory 131 (2006) 251–262]

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  • McAvoy, Alex

Abstract

We give an alternative proof of a result of Fudenberg and Imhof (2006) on the embedded Markov chain of an imitation process with small mutations. Our proof also extends this result to more general imitation processes that, with rare mutations, have unique stationary distributions but are not necessarily irreducible.

Suggested Citation

  • McAvoy, Alex, 2015. "Comment on “Imitation processes with small mutations” [J. Econ. Theory 131 (2006) 251–262]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 66-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:66-69
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.012
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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2006. "Imitation processes with small mutations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 251-262, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Veller, Carl & Hayward, Laura K., 2016. "Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 93-113.
    2. Saptarshi Pal & Christian Hilbe, 2022. "Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-11, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imitation dynamics; Stochastic processes;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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