Work organization, employment security, and macroeconomic stability
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- Gabriel Burdin, 2012.
"Does workers’ control affect firm survival? Evidence from Uruguay,"
Department of Economics University of Siena
641, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Gabriel Burdin, 2012. "Does workers’ control affect firm survival? Evidence from Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 12-06, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
- Burdín, Gabriel, 2012. "Does workers' control affect firm survival? Evidence from Uruguay," AICCON Working Papers 108-2012, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
- Susan Helper & David I. Levine & Elliot Bendoly, 2002. "Employee Involvement And Pay At Us And Canadian Auto Suppliers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 329-377, 06.
- Helper, S. & Levine, D.I. & Bendoly, E., 1999. "Employee Involvment and Pay at U.S. and Canadian Auto Suppliers," Papers 71, California Berkeley - Institute of Industrial Relations.
- Helper, Susan & Levine, David I. & Bendoly, Elliott, 2000. "Employee Involvement and Pay at U.S. and Canadian Auto Suppliers," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt8t51741b, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
- Burdín, Gabriel, 2013. "Are Worker-Managed Firms Really More Likely to Fail?," IZA Discussion Papers 7412, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Gabriel BurdÃn, 2014. "Are Worker-Managed Firms More Likely to Fail Than Conventional Enterprises? Evidence from Uruguay," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 67(1), pages 202-238, January.
- Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2014. "Employer Moral Hazard, Wage Rigidity, and Worker Cooperatives: A Theoretical Appraisal," Journal of Economic Issues, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 48(3), pages 707-726, September.
- Navarra, Cecilia & Tortia, Ermanno, 2013. "Employer moral hazard, wage rigidity and worker cooperatives: A theoretical appraisal," AICCON Working Papers 117-2013, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
- Earle, John S. & Peter, Klara Sabirianova, 2000. "Equilibrium Wage Arrears: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Institutional Lock-In," IZA Discussion Papers 196, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- John S. Earle & Klara Z. Sabirianova, 2000. "Equilibrium Wage Arrears: Institutional Lock-In of Contractual Failure in Russia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 321, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- John S. Earle & Klara Sabirianova Peter, 2004. "Contract Violations, Neighborhood Effects, And Wage Arrears In Russia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-708, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Earle, John S. & Peter, Klara Sabirianova, 2004. "Contract Violations, Neighborhood Effects, and Wage Arrears in Russia," IZA Discussion Papers 1198, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- repec:ilr:articl:v:67:y:2014:i:1:p:202-238 is not listed on IDEAS
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