Internal and external stability of bidder cartels in auctions and public tenders: A comparison of pricing rules
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- Werner Güth, 2011.
"Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits: An Axiomatic Approach,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 608-612, December.
- Werner Güth, 2010. "Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits - An Axiomatic Approach -," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-014, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Fischer, Sven & Guth, Werner & Kaplan, Todd & Zultan, Roi, 2014.
"Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation,"
58940, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Todd R. Kaplan & Ro'i Zultan, 2017. "Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation," Jena Economic Research Papers 2017-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Guth, Werner & Peleg, Bezalel, 1996. "On ring formation in auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-37, August.
- Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, "undated". "Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Selective Survey of Recent Research," Working Papers 01014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner & Ivan Soraperra, 2013.
"Buying and Selling Risk - An Experiment Investigating Evaluation Asymmetries,"
Jena Economic Research Papers
2013-047, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner & Ivan Soraperra, 2014. "Buying and Selling Risk - An Experiment Investigating Evaluation Asymmetries," CESifo Working Paper Series 4575, CESifo Group Munich.
- Werner Güth & Jeannette Brosig & Torsten Weiland, 2006. "Collusion mechanisms in procurement auctions: An experimental investigation," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-14, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald, 2007.
"Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!,"
Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 64-69, October.
- Leufkens Kasper & Peeters Ronald, 2006. "Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions!," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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