Do physician incentives affect hospital choice? A progress report
The US health reforms of March 2010 introduced new provisions for physicians providing Medicare and Medicaid services to be given financial incentives to control costs. Physician payment mechanisms generating similar incentives are currently used by some health maintenance organizations in California. We describe an ongoing research project in which we investigate physician responses to these payment schemes. The question is whether patients whose physicians have incentives to control hospital costs are admitted to lower-priced hospitals than other patients, all else equal. We provide an initial analysis of California hospital discharge data from 2003, documenting evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2004. "Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 915-931, August.
- Glied, Sherry, 2000. "Managed care," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 707-753 Elsevier.
- Katherine Ho, 2006.
"The welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the US medical care market,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(7), pages 1039-1079.
- Katherine Ho, 2005. "The Welfare Effects of Restricted Hospital Choice in the US Medical Care Market," NBER Working Papers 11819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- McClellan, Mark & Cutler, David & Newhous, Joseph P., 2000. "How Does Managed Care Do It?," Scholarly Articles 2643884, Harvard University Department of Economics. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)