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Designing Heaven’s will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service

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  • Bó, Inácio
  • Chen, Li

Abstract

We study the evolution of entry-level civil service job assignment in imperial China from the tenth to the early twentieth century. The procedures were sequential, irrevocable, and publicly verifiable, relying increasingly on lots-drawing and operating under constraints that limited which posts candidates could fill and where they could be posted. Using a unified matching framework, we compare procedures by their ability to maximize the number of filled posts and to assign higher-ranked jobs to higher-degree candidates. We show that reforms intended to improve these outcomes can instead reverse them once constraints interact, a failure driven by greedy sequential matching. Building on the structure of the final historical procedure, we describe minimal extensions of public lots-drawing mechanisms that guarantee maximum matchings under compatibility constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • Bó, Inácio & Chen, Li, 2026. "Designing Heaven’s will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 441-461.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:158:y:2026:i:c:p:441-461
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.013
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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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