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A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem

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  • Edelman, Paul H.
  • Por, Attila

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new set of axioms that characterize uniform random dictatorship (URD) as a randomized impartial nomination rule. Unlike earlier work we use a variable population model which allows us to employ axioms that reflect consistency and proportionality–axioms that ensure that the rule behaves well with respect to the combinatorial structure of the nomination profile. Earlier work characterizing URD employed strong symmetry axioms and so it is surprising that our axioms characterize the same rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Edelman, Paul H. & Por, Attila, 2021. "A new axiomatic approach to the impartial nomination problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 443-451.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:443-451
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William Thomson, 2011. "Consistency and its converse: an introduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 257-291, December.
    2. Mackenzie, Andrew, 2015. "Symmetry and impartial lotteries," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 15-28.
    3. Ron Holzman & Hervé Moulin, 2013. "Impartial Nominations for a Prize," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 173-196, January.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Javier Cembrano & Svenja M. Griesbach & Maximilian J. Stahlberg, 2023. "Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights," Papers 2310.14991, arXiv.org.

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