Sen’s proofs of the Arrow and Gibbard theorems
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.038
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References listed on IDEAS
- Susumu Cato, 2010. "Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 267-284, July.
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- Sen, Amartya, 1995. "Rationality and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 1-24, March.
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Cited by:
- Duddy, Conal & Piggins, Ashley, 2020. "A foundation for Pareto optimality," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 25-30.
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More about this item
Keywords
Preference aggregation; Arrow’s impossibility theorem; Gibbard’s theorem; Transitivity; Decisiveness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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