Impact of self interaction on the evolution of cooperation in social spatial dilemmas

In this paper, a new self interaction mechanism is integrated into two typical pairwise models including the prisoner’s dilemma and snowdrift games, where an additional payoff will be awarded into the cooperative agents. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, we take three types of additional payoffs into account, to be a fixed constant, a random value situated within the positive unilateral interval and a random one uniformly distributed within a bilateral interval. Large quantities of numerical simulations indicate the promotion of cooperation can be very noticeable whether in the case of von Neumann neighborhood or Moore neighborhood. In the meantime, the self interaction will also be extended into the snowdrift game in which two equilibria exist, and the outcomes clearly show that the collective cooperation is still drastically elevated into a higher level. Current results demonstrate that the self interaction might become a potential and effective means to enhance the behavior of cooperation, and be helpful for us to deeply understand the widespread persistence and emergence of cooperation within many animal and human being societies.